Volume 73
Issue 3 Issues 3 & 4

Article 15

September 1971

Domestic Relations--Antenuptial Agreements in Contemplation of
Divorce
Henry C. Bowen
West Virginia University College of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr
Part of the Family Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Henry C. Bowen, Domestic Relations--Antenuptial Agreements in Contemplation of Divorce, 73 W. Va. L.
Rev. (1971).
Available at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol73/iss3/15

This Case Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the WVU College of Law at The Research
Repository @ WVU. It has been accepted for inclusion in West Virginia Law Review by an authorized editor of The
Research Repository @ WVU. For more information, please contact ian.harmon@mail.wvu.edu.

Bowen: Domestic Relations--Antenuptial Agreements in Contemplation of Di

1971]

CASE COMMENTS

upon certificate of the court wherein the case is pending."3 The
statute dearly reads that expenses will be paid to protect the state's
interest, but the indigent's interest is unprotected. The prosecution is suppied with funds to cross-examine defendant's witness, but
this is unnecessary if defendant cannot afford the expense to take
the deposition. It is ironic that the state's interest is so completely
protected while the indigent is left to shift for himself. The court
in affirming the denial of defendant's motion for payment of public
funds to take the deposition of a nonresident witness stated that
there was no law authorizing the trial court to make such payments.33 It would seem that any denial of the essential expenses
required for the adequate defense of an indigent is a deprivation
of a poor person's right to effective assistance of counsel as guaranteed by the sixth amendment of the United States Constitution. If
defendant should petition in the Federal Courts for a writ of
habeas corpus, it will be interesting to note the determination of
this issue.
Joseph Wagoner
30 Id.
33 The Supreme Court of Kansas handled the lack of statutory authoriza-

ton thus:

The granting or denying of a motion to provide supporting services
to counsel for an indigent defendent is a matter within the discretion
of the trial court, whose ruling will not be disturbed in the absence

of a showing that such discretion was abused to the extent that the
defendant's substantial rights were prejudiced.

Kansas v. Young, 203 Kan. 296, 300, 454 P.2d 724, 728 (1969).

Domestic Relations-Antenuptial
Agreements In Contemplation
Of Divorce
Husband was granted a divorce from Wife, the decree providing that Husband pay six hundred dollars per month alimony.
The amount of alimony was agreed upon in an antenuptial agreement between the parties, but the lower court held the alimony
agreement was not binding. On appeal, the intermediate appellate court affirmed the divorce decree and an award of child
support, and stated that there were alternative views concerning
the amount of alimony agreed upon in the antenuptial agreement.
The three theories were;
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(1) that the parties may validly agree upon alimony in an antenuptial agreement but that the trial court
is not bound by this agreement; (2) that such an agreement is void as against public policy; and (3) that an
antenuptial agreement respecting alimony is entitled to
the same consideration and should be just as binding as an
antenuptial agreement settling property rights of the wife
in her husband's estate upon his death.'
The Florida Supreme Court, considering the validity of antenuptial agreements respecting alimony as a question of public interest, adopted the third view. Held, an antenuptial agreement
under proper conditions is valid, subject to modification on a
showing of changed conditions. Posner v. Posner 233 So. 2d 381
(Fla. 1970).
Antenuptial agreements have generally been held valid if
they deal with the disposition of property of the spouses upon their
deaths, 2 and if they clearly make reasonable provisions for the
wife and a full and fair disclosure of the husband's worth., On
the other hand, antenuptial agreements involving alimony considerations have generally been held void. Such agreements have been
thought to encourage and facilitate separation and divorce, 4 and,
therefore, courts have found these agreements to the contrary to
public policy. 5 A second argument against antenuptial agreements
1 Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 382 (Fla. 1970).

2Id. at 384.
3 In Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17, 21 (Fla. 1964),
the court
stated:
the relationship between the parties to an antenuptial agreement is
one of mutual trust and confidence. Since they do not deal at arm's
length they must exercise a high degree of good faith and candor in
all matters bearing upon the contract. The courts will no longer indulge the archaic presumption of dominance by the husband but they
will scrutinize such agreements and will require good faith disclosure
by the prospective husband of the material facts relating to the
character and value of his property showing that the prospective
bride possessed such general and approximate knowledge of his property as to enable her to reach an intelligent decision to enter into the
agreement.
4 See, e.g., Crouch v. Crouch, 53 Tenn. App. 594, 385 S.W.2d 288 (1964).
5See William v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 438, 243 P.2d 402 (1926); Watson v.
Watson, 37 Ind. App. 548, 77 N.E. 355 (1906); Cohn v. Cohn, 209 Md. 470,
121 A.2d 704 (1956); Stefonick v. Stefonick, 118 Mont. 486, 167 P.2d 848
(1946); Motley v. Motley, 255 N.G. 190, 120 S.E.2d 422 (1961). Although
no West Virginia cases specifically dealing with an antenuptial agreement respecting alimony have been found, West Virginia would probably follow the majority of jurisdictions holding such agreements to be void as contrary to public policy. See, Ryan v. Griffin, 199 Va. 891, 103 S.E.2d 240 (1958);
Wallihan v. Hughes, 196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954); Cumming v. Cumming,
127 Va. 16, 102 S.E. 572 (1920) ; 12 M. J., Marriage Contracts and Settlements,
§ § 1, 2, 3 (1950). The primary public policy consideration is the state's interest in marriage. See Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970).
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regarding alimony is that husbands should not be given the means
to relieve themselves of their marital obligation of support. 6 For the
foregoing and other reasons, antenuptial agreements respecting ali7
mony are invalid in many United States jurisdictions.
At first glance, the Posner decision is contrary to decisions in
most jurisdictions. On closer examination, however, the Posner
court made an important distinction between situations where
antenuptial alimony agreements are subsequently followed by
divorce proceedings in bad faith and those which are followed by
divorce proceedings in good faith.8 The court stated, "If such an
agreement is valid when tested ... and if, in addition, it is made
to appear that the divorce was prosecuted in good faith, on proper
grounds, so that ... it could not be said to facilitate or promote
the procurement of a divorce, then it should be held valid as to
the conditions existing at the time the agreement was made."9
Hudson v. Hudson,1 an Oklahoma decision, held that a judgment for alimony would not be valid if the parties to the divorce
proceeding had entered into a valid antenuptial agreement providing for no alimony.", In Hudson "the court simply applied ...
the rule applicable to antenuptial contracts settling property rights
upon the death of a spouse and thus tacitly, if not expressly, discarded the contrary-to-public rule."' 2 Although the Hudson court
upheld the antenuptial agreement, the court stated that the agreement had to be just and reasonable and that the court would not
have upheld the "no-alimony" agreement if the parties had acquired additional property after marriage. 3
A variety of cases closely reflects the Posner position. The
Michigan court in In Re Muxiow's Estate,14 upheld an antenuptial
agreement concerning property rights after the death or divorce of
spouses because "[n] othing in the agreement can be said to make
separation or divorce more attractive to either party .... Accordingly, since it cannot be held that any effective provision of this
8 See, e.g., Neddo v. Neddo, 56 Kan. 507, 44 P. 1 (1896) (an early view in
which the court refused to allow a husband to shield himself by an antenuptial
contract from his legal obligation of support).
7 See cases collected in Annots., 57 A.L.R.2d 942 (1958); 164 A.L.R. 1236
(1946); 98 A.L.R. 580 (1935); 70 A.L.R. 826 (1931).
8 Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 885 (Fla. 1970).
9rd.
10 350 P.2d 596 (Okla. 1960).

'I Id. at 597.
12 Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 881, 384 (Fla. 1970).
13 Hudson v. Hudson, 350 P.2d 596, 597, 598 (Okla. 1970).
14 867 Mich. 133, 116 N.W.2d 43 (1962).
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agreement provided for, facilitated, or tended to induce a separation or divorce, the agreement was not against public policy .... 15
In Sanders v. Sanders,18 the Tennessee court held an antenuptial
property agreement was not against public policy if the divorce
were prosecuted in good faith.' 7 And in Shultz v. Brabender,1S the
Montana court took an analogous position concerning postnuptial
agreements by distinguishing between an agreement facilitating a
divorce (invalid) and an agreement which is subsequently followed
by a divorce sought on proper grounds (valid) .19
In Law of Domestic Relations, Professor Clark stated that per-

haps the primary reason courts object to antenuptial agreements
respecting alimony and support is that although the provisions
may be fair when made, they may not be fair when the parties are
subsequently divorced. 20 Because future circumstances often change,
courts have refused to enforce antenuptial contracts that attempt
to limit the husband's future support obligations.-z This objection
is eliminated by the Posner decision's provision that a modification
of the decree for alimony may be had by a showing of a change in
circumstances. 22 The Florida court, by recognizing the validity of
this antenuptial agreement but retaining the right to modify the
sum, reached practically the same result as the Wisconsin court in
2
Strandbergv. Strandberg,which held such an antenuptial contract

void but allowed it to be introduced to help determine the settle24
ment after the divorce.
The reasoning in Posner stems from the court's awareness of
the changing attitudes and public policy concerning divorce.2 5 The
trend "requires a change in the rule respecting antenuptial agreeIsId. at 137, 116 N.W.2d at 46.
1840 Tenn. App. 20, 288 S.W.2d 473 (1955).
17 Id. at 35, 288 S.W.2d at 479.
Is 136 Mont. 152, reported sub nor. Shultz v. Fox, 545 P.2d 1045 (1959).
' Id. at 160, 545 P.2d at 1050.
20 H. CLARK, Law of Domestic Relations § 1.9, at 29 (1968).
21 Id.
22
West Virginia courts, by statute, are allowed to modify alimony and
maintenance upon a showing of change of circumstances. By recognizing the
antenuptial agreement as binding, the Florida court incorporated the agreement
into the decree with the stipulation that it could be modified. A West Virginia court could well reach the same result. See, W. VA. CoDE ch. 48, art. 2,
§§ 15, 16 (Michie Supp. 1970).
23 3 Wis. 2d 204, 147 N.W.2d 349 (1967).
24 Id. at 209, 147 N.W.2d at 351.
25 Posner v. Posner, 235 So. 2d 581, 584 (Fla. 1970). The court stressed the
changing societal attitudes concerning marriage and divorce, citing California's
adoption of a non-guilty party concept in divorce proceedings. See, Comment,
The End of Innocence: Elimination of Fault in California Divorce Law, 17
UCLA L REv. 1506 (1970).
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ments settling alimony and property rights of the parties upon
divorce... [and] such agreements should no longer be held to be
void ab initio as 'contrary to public policy.' ",26 This decision is
illustrative of a more situationalist approach to antenuptial alimony agreements. As the Posner court noted, "With divorce such
a commonplace fact of life, it is fair to assume that many prospective marriage partners ...

might want to consider ...

the dis-

position of their property and the ailmony rights of the wife in the
event their marriage, despite their best efforts, should fail."2M
Henry C. Bowen
Posner v. Posner, 233 So.2d 381, 385 (Fla. 1970).
21Id. at 384.

Draft Law-Requirements For
Classification And Exemption As
Conscientious Objector
Elliott Ashton Welsh, II, was convicted in a United States District Court for refusal to submit to induction into the Armed Forces.1 Welsh contended that section 6 (j) 2 of the Universal Military
Training and Service Act exempted him from service in the armed
forces because he was conscientiously opposed to war as a result
of his "religious training and belief." 3 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that Welsh had no religious
basis for his conscientious objection claim and therefore affirmed
the conviction. 4 Welsh then petitioned the United States Supreme
Court for certiorari, which was granted on the basis of that court's
decision in United States v. Seeger.' Held, reversed. The decision
of the court of appeals was found to be inconsistent with the
Court's holding in Seeger.
150 App. U.S.C. § 462 (a) (1968).
150 App. U.S.C. § 456 (j) (Supp. V 1970):

Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require any
person to be subject to combatant training and service in the armed
forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and
belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form.
As used in this subsection, the term "religion training and belief,"
does not include essentially political, sociological, or philosophical
views, or a merely personal moral code. ...
sWelsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970).
4Welsh v. United States, 404 F.2d 1078 (9th Cir. 1968), rev'd, 398 U.S.
333 (1970).
33380 U.S. 163 (1965), affg, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), rev'g.,
216 F. Supp.

516 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
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